The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran: Which one?

Sunday, February 18, 2007

KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Hussein Tahiri

The news of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran’s (KDPI) split on the 6th of December 2006 has unfortunately passed, at least within international circles, to a great extent unnoticed. Is it because such a party is not relevant to the political reality of Kurdistan, or has the event been overshadowed by international and regional political developments? It could be either scenario; in fact, it is very likely to be both.

When the news of the KDPI’s split was announced it was greeted with sadness by the Kurds and their allies. A sense of betrayal was felt by the families of peshmargas who sacrificed their life for the Kurdish cause, and a sense of jubilation by Kurdish enemies.

The KDPI has been handicapped by internal rivalries for the past several years. As a result, its political activities were lessened dramatically; to the extent that the Party’s very viability was placed under question mark. A party which had been known for its democratic principles eventually become intolerant towards it’s own membership, to the point that division within the ranks eventually led to a split.

Why did the KDPI’s leaders have so many differences that such a split became inevitable? It does not seem that there are any ideological differences between the two new resulting parties. Both groups now call themselves the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, both claim to follow the path of Qazi Muhammad, Qasimlu, and Sharafkandi. Both seem to want federalism; both believe that the Islamic Republic of Iran should be overthrown. So far, neither side of the new political conflict has given any ideological or methodological reasons for their split from a central party identity.

Nevertheless, a lot of blame shifting and accusations are taking place. One side blames the other for behaving like dictators within the political machine. Another has accused the other for not abiding by democratic principles. Both counterparts claim to be democratic, flexible, having the interests of the Kurdish people as their priorities and being ready to compromise. However in practical terms, they do not follow-up their claims with any evidence of the above.

Both sides insist that two thirds of the party ranks have joined them. At the same time, they are not ready to wait for another year to exercise their “democratic” muscles, and prove without a doubt that their stance is correct. Given that there seem to be no ideological differences, is it so hard to wait for a year to demonstrate unequivocally their claims that they represent two third of the party and gain the control of the KDPI?

The reality is that laying blame and accusations do not resolve this sensitive and politically incorrect split; such actions will only exacerbate the problem. In a way, this split may end the stagnation the KDPI has been facing, but if it is not contained it could lead to a much worse and undesirable situation. It could lead to armed clashes between resulting factions, as has happened over previous splits. It could result in a situation where one side makes an alliance with the PUK and the other with the KDP, a situation that existed during the late 1960s and early 1970s [1]. Either of these situations could destroy any hard-wrought spirit of cooperation and further dishearten the Kurdish struggle in Iran.

In this sensitive time the Kurds of Iran expect their leaders to be sensible, generous and humble. They expect their leaders to put aside personal difference and antagonism in order to advance the greater Kurdish cause.

International and regional political developments have created a great opportunity for the Kurds. The Islamic Republic of Iran is facing international condemnation for its nuclear program and its human rights abuses. The KDPI leadership could have utilized this opportunity to advance sympathy for the Kurdish cause in Iran. However, instead, the leadership have put their personal interests above Kurdish interests. If such a great opportunity, created by international and regional developments, is not utilized by their own political party, the Kurds will not forgive the KDPI leadership, and nor should they.

If antagonism within the KDPI means stagnation, intolerance and ignoring democratic principles, then the KDPI would be better off split. Yet if there is even a vague hope that the KDPI leadership is willing to put aside personal interests in favor of national interests it would be better off having one united KDPI. The least the Kurds expect is that any resulting political parties emerging from the split groups will cooperate with each other to advance the Kurdish cause. This requires concessions from both sides and a greater devotion to the Kurdish cause. And, it will mean putting an end to the current atmosphere of blaming, bitterness and accusations.

The KDPI cannot function and continue with two KDPIs which are to all intents and purposes, identical, yet separate. Finding a peaceful solution to this internal conflict will demonstrate the maturity of the KDPI leadership and it will be the first test for future cooperation between these two factions. History is a lesson for both the present time and the future yet to come. Divisions in the past have never resulted in any positive outcomes for the Kurds. If the wood of the mighty tree is shaved off into splinter groups, how will a strong and flourishing Kurdistan evolve and grow?

There is still an opportunity for the KDPI to unite. If there are problems they need to be referred to the party rank and file; they should be the one who determine who leads the KDPI. Whoever gains a majority of the votes should lead; this is democracy, if, indeed, the KDPI leadership, members and cadres believe in democracy. If any are not happy with the result, hard work and the gaining of trust and confidence of party members and cadres for the next election through vision and policies is the sensible route. If issues are dealt with in this manner the KDPI will advance into an efficient and successful political party. Otherwise, another ten years will be gone before the KDPI leadership realises what has been lost. Such a loss of confidence would result in a complete lack of credibility for the party, a situation which would be impossible to reverse.

If the leadership of both factions cannot reconcile their differences, I would encourage the KDPIs leadership to challenge each other in a TV debate on Tishk or another Kurdish satellite TV to enable the Kurds to make an informed decision who to support. An informed populace, after all, is one of the hallmarks of democracy, which both factions claim to support. So, let us hear your conversation.

Endnotes

[1] In the 1960s, the KDPI members who had fled to Iraqi Kurdistan were divided into two factions. The conservative and more traditional nationalist faction was led by the KDPI leader, Ahmad Tawfiq (Abdullah Ishaghi), who aliened himself with Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The leftist faction comprised of young KDPI members (later on to be led by Abdurahman Qasimlou) who had tendencies towards socialism aliened themselves with the members of the KDP politburo, led by Ibrahim Ahmad, who opposed Mulla Mustafa.

Dr. Hussein Tahiri, a regular KurdishMedia.com contributor, is a Middle East commentator and an Honorary Research Associate with the School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University